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I Articles I
Learning from Comparative Law in
Teaching U.S. Corporate Law: Director's
Liability in Japan and the U.S.
Bruce E. Aronson*
Abstract
This article demonstrates how a comparative law perspective can be
usefully incorporated into the teaching of U.S. corporate law through a
comparison of the director's duty of care in the U.S. and Japan. It
focuses on the landmark Daiwa Bank shareholder derivative case
decided in September 2000, in which the Osaka district court ordered
eleven current and former directors of Daiwa Bank to pay a record $775
million in damages for breaches of fiduciary duty in two cases related to
the bank's well-known trading loss scandal of 1995. The legal doctrine
and aftermath of the Daiwa Case are compared to the leading Delaware
cases of Van Gorkom and Caremark. In order to make broad functional
comparisons and to provide an example of how comparative law could
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be utilized in the teaching of basic U.S. law courses, the article is written
in the form of an introductory essay and a sample set of supplemental
course materials.
In comparing directors' duties in the two legal systems, I find both
surprisingly broad similarities and a number of interesting differences.
Despite Japan's civil law system with statutory fiduciary duties, the
courts in both countries played similar roles and encountered similar
difficulties in interpreting broad formulations of the duty of care and
reducing them to a clear standard of liability. The aftermath of both
Daiwa and Van Gorkom included new legislation to limit directors'
liability and the potential to exert an important impact on corporate
practices. The biggest difference is the lack of separation of officers and
directors in Japan, which leads Japanese courts to focus on the actions
and responsibility of individual directors rather than the emphasis in U.S.
courts on actions of the board as a whole. It also has led, in Japan, to
legislation that explicitly distinguishes between the liability of inside and
outside directors in an effort to increase the number and role of outside
directors. In addition, although courts in both countries have created a
business judgment rule, its procedural emphasis makes its application
more difficult in Japan where there is limited corporate disclosure and
discovery.
I conclude that a broader comparison of U.S. corporate law with
other legal systems can, in fact, act both to provide a deeper examination
of the legal doctrine and underlying policy considerations of our own
system, and to aid in preparing students for encounters with other legal
systems.
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I. Introduction
Whereas just 20 years ago several law firms touted "international"
practice as a firm specialty, today it is an integral part of the practice of
business (and many other) lawyers. In the age of globalization, few
would argue with the general proposition that law schools need to
prepare students to operate in an environment where they will regularly
encounter foreign or multinational clients, cross-border transactions, and
the interpretation of foreign regulations by non-U.S. attorneys. In many
areas of teaching law, it is a challenge to move beyond covering a topic
in specialized courses and infuse (or at least introduce) the valuable and
increasingly important international perspective in basic courses. The
question of the "internationalization" of the law school curriculum has
received increased attention over the past few years, with a number of
prominent law schools undertaking new and ambitious efforts in this
area. 
1
The basic business organizations course would be an ideal course
for the early introduction of a comparative perspective to law students
generally, and to future business lawyers in particular. Theoretically,
that course provides students with an understanding of corporate legal
doctrine, a broad sense of underlying policy considerations, and practical
business issues that are highly relevant to the role of business advisor.
A broader comparison of U.S. corporate law with other legal systems, as
opposed to the narrower comparison of the corporate laws of Delaware
and the Revised Model Business Corporations Act, would encourage a
deeper examination of the underpinnings of our own system and aid in
preparing students for their inevitable encounters with other legal
systems.
However, the basic business organizations course is also one of the
1. Notable among recent efforts is Michigan Law School's requirement that all
first-year students take an introductory survey course on transnational law.
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most crowded subjects in the curriculum. Its core topics already require
at least some introduction to economic theory, agency, partnership,
finance, accounting, tax and other areas. Additionally, the importance of
securities law to the basic course has been steadily increasing. There
already are other competing topics worthy of inclusion or greater
emphasis in the basic course, such as the professional- ethics of business
lawyers serving corporate clients. Accordingly, adding a special
comparative law section to the basic course, such as comparative
corporate governance, would probably be difficult.2  Adding
supplementary materials to complement existing topics would seem the
most practical approach, but, to date, there has been a paucity of such
materials. As a result, despite the general appeal of a comparative
approach, apparently little headway has been made in bringing such an
approach to bear on basic courses such as business organizations.
3
In a modest attempt to address the lack of materials in this area, I
have created a set of comparative supplemental materials focusing on the
duty of care of corporate directors. Those supplemental course materials
are set forth in Section II of this article. This area of law strikes me as
being a good candidate for comparative analysis as the general
requirement that directors perform their duties with reasonable care has
proven to be quite difficult to reduce to legal principles and standards of
liability. The balance sought by the business judgment rule-providing
directors with broad discretion to make business judgments while also
providing an incentive for the good faith performance of their duties-
should be a policy concern of all corporate law regimes. The leading
U.S. case in the area, Van Gorkom,4 can be a cumbersome and difficult
vehicle for shedding light and stimulating discussion on the underlying
policy issues.5 A comparative analysis might well be useful in this
2. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Essay: Fundamental Themes in Business Law
Education: Comparative Corporate Governance and Pedagogy, 34 GA. L. REv. 721
(2000). Cunningham speculates that comparative corporate governance will mature into
a topic routinely covered by the basic course, but concludes that, at present, the benefits
and costs are a "close call." He suggests the pursuit of "modest ways to conduct the
introduction that still enable the benefits while keeping the costs low." Id. at 741.
3. A number of law teachers have made individual efforts to incorporate a
comparative perspective into the basic courses which they teach. There have also been
proposals in the past to teach comparative law as an integral part of courses throughout
the curriculum. See Michael P. Waxman, The Comparative Legal Process Throughout
the Law School Curriculum: A Modest Proposal for Culture and Competence in a
Pluralistic Society, 74 MARQ. L. REv. 391 (1991). But despite widespread interest in the
general idea, most law teachers find it difficult to cover the topics already included within
their basic courses, let alone adding complementary comparative law subjects. See, e.g.,
Michael P, Waxman, Teaching Comparative Law in the 2 1st Century: Beyond the
Civil/Common Law Dichotomy, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 305 n.2 (2001).
4. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) [Trans Union Case].
5. The Delaware Supreme Court found directors' liability based on gross
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regard.
. To make a comparison, I utilized materials from Japanese law
centering on fiduciary duties under the Japanese Commercial Code and
the interpretation of fiduciary duties under Nishimura v. Abekawa, a
recent landmark shareholder derivative suit related to the well-known
Daiwa Bank scandal (hereinafter the Daiwa Case or the Daiwa Bank
Case).6 There are many reasons why the Japanese legal system is a good
subject for comparative analysis.7 As a unitary, civil law system, the
relevant corporate laws are all national laws where the duties of directors
are established by statute. Legal duties exist within a "legal culture" that
most students perceive to be very different from that of the U.S. and
Europe. The basic scheme of corporate law and director's duties, revised
under the postwar U.S. occupation, is similar to that of the U.S. but
retains some important German-inspired provisions. Also, despite the
"lost decade" of the 1990s, Japan remains the world's second largest
economy and a leading U.S. trade partner; and it is a non-Western legal
system that students may well encounter during their professional
careers. Japanese corporate law is in the midst of debate and change,
negligence due to the failure to make an informed judgment by utilizing all material
reasonably available in approving a cash-out merger. Despite a complex fact pattern,
involved issues of law, and being almost immediately overturned in Delaware by the
legislature's enactment of a new state exculpatory charter provision, this case continues
to generate wide comment and occupies the most prominent position in corporate law
casebooks with respect to a director's duty of care and the business judgment rule. See,
e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Fiduciary Duty, Limited Liability and the Law of
Delaware: Why IDo Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477 (2000).
6. Nishimura v. Abekawa, 1721 HANREI JIHO 3 (Osaka Dist. Ct., Sept. 20, 2000).
[hereinafter the Daiwa Case or the Daiwa Bank Case.] In this case, the Osaka district
court, in a voluminous decision, ordered eleven current and former directors of Daiwa
Bank to pay a total of $775 million in damages in two cases related to the bank's well-
known 1995 trading loss scandal. In the first case, the court found that the Daiwa
directors' failure to establish an appropriate internal control system, which could have
prevented or discovered a $1.1 billion loss resulting from unauthorized trading in the
bank's New York branch, was a breach of the oversight component of their duty of care.
In the second case, the court found a breach of the directors' duty to comply with law in
connection with concealment of losses and failure to report criminal activity to U.S.
authorities in the timely manner that United States law requires. For an analysis of the
decision, see Bruce E. Aronson, Reconsidering the Importance of Law in Japanese
Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Daiwa Bank Shareholder Derivative Case, 36
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 11 (2003).
7. For a discussion of the merits of teaching Japanese law as a separate course, see,
e.g., Kenneth L. Port, The Case for Teaching Japanese Law at American Law Schools, 43
DEPAUL L. REv. 643 (1994). Globalization has sparked ambitious proposals concerning
the importance of comparative law in legal education. See, e.g. Gloria M. Sanchez, A
Paradigm Shift in Legal Education: Preparing Law Students for the Twenty-First
Century: Teaching Foreign Law, Culture, and Legal Language of the Major U.S.
American Trading Partners, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 635, 679 (1997) (arguing that in the
age of globalization, legal education in the United States "should include, at a minimum,
courses on the law, culture and language of Canada, Mexico, and Japan").
2003]
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often with specific references to U.S. law and corporate governance
practices and interesting adaptations of U.S. approaches to local
circumstances.
An examination of the current ferment in Japanese law leads to
many interesting questions. How does a director's duty of care work in a
system in which there was traditionally no separation of officers and
directors? In a system with limited corporate disclosure and discovery in
litigation, can such fiduciary duties be primarily procedural in nature?
Should there be a lower level of liability for outside directors in order to
encourage their widespread use? To what extent can directors rely on the
performance of other directors, outside counsel or even informal advice
from government agencies? Japan's struggle with these questions
highlights interesting issues about our own legal system that might
otherwise be taken for granted.
I have organized the comparative supplemental course materials
into six subsections. Subsection A contains a brief note on Japanese law
with an accessible diagram of the traditional Japanese corporate
structure.8 Subsection B summarizes the factual background of the
Daiwa Bank Case. Subsection C summarizes the Daiwa decision and
contains a series of excerpts from the court's judgment. Subsection D
briefly summarizes a 2001 amendment to Japan's Commercial Code to
limit directors' liability. Subsection E lists the parallels and differences
between the Japanese law introduced here and comparable U.S. law.
Subsection F provides sample questions and answers in order to make
comparisons with U.S. statutory law and case law in Van Gorkom and
Caremark9 and to stimulate discussion.10
8. The diagram provides sufficient background to enable the reader to read and
understand the Daiwa decision.
9. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Caremark is the leading Delaware case on the oversight/monitoring component of a
director's duty of care. It involved directors failing to monitor violations of law and the
resulting payment of substantial criminal and civil fines of some $250 million. In
approving a proposed settlement, the Chancellor found that it was a director's duty to
create reporting systems that will allow the board to make informed judgments with
respect to compliance with law. Id.
10. It is assumed that students have read the Van Gorkom and Caremark cases and
related statutory material.
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II. Comparative Supplemental Course Materials
A. Note on Japanese Law
1. Corporate Law
The Japanese Commercial Code, originally enacted in the late 1 9th
century, was based on German law and rewritten in 1950 under the U.S.
occupation. The basic scheme of corporate law and directors' duties is
functionally similar to that of U.S. law, but contains important formal
differences. Chief among these differences is the Commercial Code's
retention of the German-inspired positions of representative director and
internal corporate auditor ("Auditor"). Directors, who are elected by
shareholders, choose one or more representative directors from their
ranks and directors have a duty to monitor the performance of these
representative director(s).11 Much like a president, the representative
director(s) is granted the authority to represent the corporation.
Traditionally, there was no provision for officers and no separation
of managers and directors in Japanese corporations. Instead, directors
were nearly all senior managers promoted from within the firm.
Becoming a director was regarded merely as a step up in the chain of
promotion. This led to large boards with hierarchical structures in which
directors retain "line" responsibilities to manage or control a department
of the corporation.
All corporations are required to have Auditors, and since 1993,
large corporations must have a board of auditors with at least one
outsider. Auditors, who are also elected by shareholders, are required by
the Commercial Code to monitor the directors' performance. The
Auditors' function is to oversee the performance of directors generally,
rather than to focus on accounting issues or financial statements. Unlike
a German Supervisory Board, Auditors in Japan have no power to
appoint directors. Critics of the Japanese system complain that no real
supervision of management exists; generally, directors do not supervise
representative directors, and, in practice, Auditors have not effectively
fulfilled their.assigned function of overseeing the performance of
directors.
11. See Traditional Structure of Japanese Corporate Governance diagram infra.
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Traditional Structure of Japanese Corporate Government
2. Fiduciary Duties
Japanese directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and
shareholders. Such duties are generally similar to those mandated by
U.S. law. In addition, code provisions regarding directors' duties include
a specific duty of compliance with laws and regulations. Under the
theory that Auditors are not involved in conducting the corporation's
business and would, therefore, have no conflicts of interest, Auditors
[Vol. 22:2
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owe a duty of care to the corporation, but not a duty of loyalty. Because
the Japanese system is a unitary, civil law system, the duties of directors
and Auditors are established by statute, and all of the relevant corporate
laws are national. Civil litigation is utilized for the application of such
statutes to specific cases.
This traditional structure of Japanese corporate governance has been
undergoing considerable change over the past few years. A substantial
minority of public corporations have taken action to reduce the size of
the boards of directors, add a new class of executive officers with the
stated intention of achieving separation between management and the
board of directors, and add some outside directors to the board. An
amendment to the Commercial Code in November 2001 sought to
strengthen the independence of Auditors by requiring, inter alia, that at
least half of the Auditors be outsiders. A separate overhaul of the
Commercial Code enacted in May 2002 provides for a new, optional,
"American-style" form of corporate governance under which the
German-inspired positions of representative director and Auditor are
abolished and replaced by a new representative executive officer and
three committees (audit, nominating and compensation) of the board of
directors.
3. Key Commercial Code Provisions
Duty of Care The Commercial Code states that "[t]he relationship
between the company and the directors shall be governed by the
provisions relating to mandate."' 12 This also applies to Auditors under
article 280(1). Under the Civil Code, "[a] mandatary is obligated to
manage the entrusted affairs with the care of a good manager in
accordance with the tenor of the mandate."' 13 Regarding liability, the
Commercial Code states, "directors... shall be jointly and severally
liable.., to the company... where they have done any act which
violates any law, ordinance or the articles of incorporation."'
14
Duty of Loyalty Regarding a director's duty of loyalty, the Commercial
Code requires that "[t]he directors shall comply with laws, ordinances,
and the provisions of the articles of incorporation, as well as resolutions
adopted at a general meeting, and shall perform their duties faithfully on
behalf of the company."
15
12. SHOHO, art. 254, para. 3.
13. MiNPO, art. 644.
14. SHOHO, art. 266, para. 1, no. v.
15. SHOHO, art. 254-3.
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4. Shareholder Derivative Suits
Since 1950 the Commercial Code has contained provisions allowing
derivative actions by shareholders against a corporation's directors and
Auditors for any breach of duty owed to the corporation. 6 The number
and importance of such suits began to increase significantly following
the collapse of the bubble economy and an important revision to the
Commercial Code in 1993 that greatly reduced filing fees in derivatives
suits. Prior to the Daiwa Bank Case, however, courts often utilized a
"security for expenses" provision of the Commercial Code, and ordered
plaintiffs to post substantial bonds. This effectively ended derivative
litigation. Plaintiffs could avoid posting security for expenses only when
they were able to overcome the lack of an effective discovery system by
piggybacking on the record created by a criminal or other official
investigation. Plaintiffs were successful in obtaining settlements only in
a narrow set of cases where directors took illegal action (e.g., paying off
racketeers or bribing government officials). Yet, even in those cases the
settlement amounts were for only a tiny fraction of the plaintiffs' claim.
B. Factual Background to the Daiwa Bank Case
The tale begins with the 1976 hiring of Toshihide Iguchi17 as a local
employee of the New York branch of The Daiwa Bank Limited
("Daiwa"). The following year Iguchi was put in charge of the securities
custody department. As with many foreign banks, the actual custody of
securities was entrusted to a sub-custodian, in this case, Bankers Trust,
which received instructions from and sent account statements to Daiwa's
New York branch. In February of 1984, Iguchi was promoted to be the
only trader, and placed in charge of a new effort in the bank's securities
business-trading a small volume of U.S. treasuries for the bank's own
account (in an attempt to obtain trading profits) as opposed to merely
executing orders on behalf of customers. Presumably due to the
miniscule size of the operation, Iguchi was left in charge of both
securities trading and custody as well as some related back office
functions.1
8
16. SHOHO, arts. 267 to 268-3, 280, para. 1
17. Mr. Iguchi moved from Japan to the United States to attend college, majoring in
psychology at Southwest Missouri State University. Upon graduation in 1975, he briefly
sold used cars and then joined the New York Branch of Daiwa bank. Thus, he did not
have the "elite" resume of a typical managerial employee of a major Japanese bank and
had no experience in banking. According to Mr. Iguchi's book, written later while in
prison, he obtained a job at Daiwa through his father's personal connections. See
TOSHIHIDE IGUCHI, KOKUHAKU [THE CONFESSION] 116 (1997).
18. It is appropriate to separate these areas precisely because of the potential for
wrongdoing, with a trader being in a position to (illegally) obtain funding for trading
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Although Iguchi initially traded within the established position limit
and made a small profit, he soon began to accumulate losses. In an
attempt to recover the loss, and out of fear that reporting this loss to his
superiors would result in a halt to the new trading operation, he engaged
in unauthorized trades above the established limit. Nevertheless, losses
steadily mounted and reached $1.1 billion by the time the incident was
revealed in 1995. To conceal the growing losses, Iguchi began issuing
unauthorized instructions to Bankers Trust to sell customers' and the
bank's securities. Iguchi's unauthorized trading and sales of securities
went undetected for eleven years and eventually involved some 30,000
transactions. 19 He ultimately sold some $377 million of customer
securities.
Iguchi wrote a series of confession letters to Akira Fujita, the
president of Daiwa, and other top officials in mid-July to early August of
1995. The very first of these letters to Daiwa's president, dated July 17,
which Iguchi labeled his "honest confession," revealed the $1.1 billion
trading loss and other unauthorized actions, and warned of the dire
consequences of this information becoming public. He suggested a
"solution" to the problem: replace the missing securities and move the
concealed loss out of the United States to prevent U.S. authorities from
handling the matter. The bank's receipt of this first letter on July 24th
marks a critical juncture in the case. Up to that point, Daiwa had been
primarily a victim of unauthorized and unlawful actions by Iguchi.
However, the actions of top management would soon result in a new and
legally more significant cover-up phase of the case.
A Daiwa executive flew to New York to meet Iguchi and to confirm
the losses. Iguchi showed him the actual Bankers Trust account
statements and the fictitious ones he had created to conceal the losses.
Upon the executive's return to Japan, Daiwa's president decided the
bank's basic position: maintain secrecy, cooperate with Iguchi, and
activities through the unauthorized sale or lending of custody securities. This was
exacerbated by Iguchi also having responsibilities for some related back office functions
(trade confirmations, settlement of trades, and record keeping). Back office personnel
would normally be in a position to check trading and custody activities. The importance
of such internal controls came to be emphasized later in the 1990s, and was given a huge
boost by the Daiwa Case and other scandals, such as Baring Bank, in 1995.
19. The precise mechanism for the execution and concealment of unauthorized
trades and sales of securities is not entirely clear. It is likely that Iguchi was given
considerable leeway because he was reporting substantial profits. It appears that Iguchi
entered into the branch's books certain unauthorized profitable trades or profitable
aspects of complicated trades without entering his much larger losses. In an interview
with Time magazine Iguchi claimed that he was responsible for "more than half' of the
branch's profits, despite the fact that the authorized trading of U.S. treasuries within
Daiwa's established limits should have been a relatively low risk/low return activity. See
William Dowell, I Didn 't Set out to Rob a Bank, TIME, Feb. 10, .1997, at 20.
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report informally to the Japanese Ministry of Finance ("MOF"). There
was reportedly no discussion of contacting U.S. authorities. On August
8, the president and other top executives of Daiwa met for dinner at the
bank's guest house with the director general and the relevant section
chief of MOF's Banking Bureau to report the matter. They described
Iguchi's letter and the losses and inquired about the timing of their write-
off of the loss and public disclosure. The director general's reported
reply was that this was the worst time for such a financial scandal to be
made public due to recent problems at a number of financial institutions
and more general concerns about the state of the Japanese banking
system. Daiwa's management believed that the government had agreed
with its approach.
From early August until mid-September, the Bank continued to
conduct business as usual at its New York branch without
acknowledging Iguchi's significant losses. Numerous actions were also
undertaken to conceal the losses, including the continuing sale of custody
securities and creation of fictitious custody account statements, filing of
the bank's regular quarterly call report on assets and liabilities with the
Federal Reserve Board containing some $600 million of non-existent
assets, and undertaking a fictitious transfer of the missing securities to
Daiwa's head office. Toward the end of August, Daiwa's own U.S.
planning office advised that U.S. bank regulators would react harshly to
this kind of problem, and it should be reported as quickly as possible.
Daiwa finally reported the losses to other Japanese bank regulators and
to U.S. bank regulators. in mid-September, some seven weeks after the
receipt of Iguchi's first confession letter and five weeks after reporting
the matter to the MOF.20 Fearing that the matter would become public
knowledge once it reported to the U.S. authorities, Daiwa made a public
announcement on September 26, 1995, rather than waiting until after the
end of its fiscal period on September 30.
-Once U.S. bank regulators and prosecutors learned of the loss and
began to gather evidence, they realized that the matter was far broader
and more serious than the mere fact of a $1.1 billion dollar loss. They
discovered the involvement of the bank's top management in a cover-up
and its prior report to the MOF in Japan. They also learned, for the first
time, of a prior, similar case of unauthorized trading, unreported losses at
Daiwa Trust, 2' and false statements to bank examiners about securities
20. Federal bank regulations set a maximum thirty-day limit for reporting suspected
criminal activity and require immediate notification by telephone in the case of
emergencies. New York State banking regulations also contain a provision for the
notification of criminal or suspicious activity, which always requires immediate reporting
of losses.
21. Daiwa Trust was a separate New York-chartered trust subsidiary of Daiwa.
(Vol. 22:2
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trading operations during examinations of Daiwa's New York branch in
1992 and 1993. Much of this information apparently came from Iguchi,
who was arrested by the FBI on September 23, 1995, and pleaded guilty
on October 19, 1995 to all six counts against him.22 The reaction of U.S.
authorities was swift and decisive. Bank regulators first issued a notice
of hearing and interim orders; on November 2, 1995, they levied the
"death penalty" against Daiwa and Daiwa Trust, issuing consent orders
requiring them to cease all U.S. banking business and surrender their
banking licenses within 90 days. On the same date, a grand jury indicted
both Daiwa (24 counts) and the New York branch's general manager
(two counts).
Pressure on Daiwa gradually increased and it ultimately entered into
a plea bargain on February 28, 1996, pleading guilty to 16 of the 24
counts in the indictment. The bank agreed to pay a criminal fine of $340
million, the largest criminal fine levied on a financial institution in U.S.
history. The bank also incurred some $10 million in legal fees.
Although Daiwa and the branch general manager initially plead not
guilty, claiming they were acting under the instructions of the Japanese
government, they each entered into a plea bargain to resolve the matter
and, in the case of Daiwa, to avoid the possibility of a truly staggering
criminal fine under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
Fallout from the case was significant in both the United States and
Japan. In the U.S., congressional committees in both houses held
hearings emphasizing Daiwa's violation of the basic trust necessary
between banks and regulators and dismay at the failure of the MOF to
disclose the matter to U.S. authorities despite international agreements
on regulatory cooperation. The Daiwa Case shattered the underlying
assumption that Japanese practices and banking regulation were
22. Iguchi was sometimes portrayed in the media as a "rogue trader," acting on his
own and out of a mistaken notion of loyalty to the bank (i.e., going overboard in an effort
to recover the initial trading losses rather than acting for personal gain). In reality,
however, in perpetrating his scheme for 11 years, Iguchi obtained the cooperation of
other bank personnel (one count of his charge is entitled "trading conspiracy" and makes
several references to Iguchi's "co-conspirators") and pleaded guilty to embezzlement
from the bank (for $520,000). The bank essentially turned in Iguchi to the authorities
when they finally reported the scandal to U.S. bank regulators. Iguchi, who had no
advance notice of his impending arrest, felt the bank betrayed him by violating their
agreement to cooperate, and the information he provided to U.S. authorities ultimately
brought down the bank.
23. Daiwa faced a potential fine of over a billion dollars under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines. The range of fines for a particular offense is calculated according to a "base
fine," i.e., the amount of the pecuniary loss or gain multiplied by a factor based on the
culpability of the organization. In this case Daiwa would receive the highest culpability
score, resulting in a multiplication of the customer losses ($377 million) by a factor of
two to four.
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fundamentally sound. In Japan, Daiwa suffered business setbacks
(including a two-notch downgrade of its debt by Standard and Poors),
and the resignation of top executives of the bank in October 1995,
shortly after the public announcement of the incident. The market began
to assess a premium on Japanese banks for inter-bank loans. It suddenly
became possible, and even popular, to advocate the break-up of the
powerful MOF in conjunction with ongoing administrative reforms.
On October 23, 1995, shareholders instituted a derivative suit in
Japan, accusing all 47 of the bank's directors and Auditors who served
during the period of 1984-1995 of breach of their duty of oversight by
their failure to establish a risk management system designed to prevent
and detect such employee misconduct. The plaintiffs demanded that the
defendants reimburse the corporation for the entire amount of the $1.1
billion trading loss (Trading Loss Case (Case A)).
On March 17, 1996, following the bank's plea bargain with respect
to its criminal case in New York, shareholders filed a second derivative
action in Japan alleging that the directors and Auditors breached their
duty under the Commercial Code to comply with "laws, ordinances and
the articles of incorporation" and demanded that the defendants pay the
entire amount of the fine and legal fees ($350 million) to the corporation
(Violation of Law Case (Case B)).
C. The Court's Decision
1. Summary of Court's Decision
On September 20, 2000, the Osaka District Court, in a voluminous
decision, ordered eleven of the defendants to pay a total of $775 million
in damages in the two related cases. In the Trading Loss Case (Case A),
the court found that the three directors who had been in charge of the
New York branch during this time period and one Auditor were in breach
of their duties. Proof of damages was found only for one defendant. He
was found liable for the entire amount ($530 million) of the increase in
Iguchi's trading losses which occurred during his tenure as director in
charge of the New York branch. In the Violation of Law Case (Case B),
the court found breaches of the duties of care and loyalty for eleven
directors for specific illegal acts and failure to report, or cause the
representative director to report, to U.S. authorities. Each of the eleven
defendants was ordered to pay 20-70% of the total of $350 million (i.e.,
$70 million-$245 million).
Although both sides appealed from the judgment of the district
court, on December 20, 2001, a settlement was reached to end the
dispute. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the plaintiffs accepted a
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small fraction of the awarded damage amount (250 million yen or
roughly $2 million) in return for payment from each of the original 47
defendants and preservation of the district court's legal findings on
directors' liability.
2 Excerpts from the Court's Decision in the Daiwa Bank Case
24
Judgment
[One defendant in Case A and eleven defendants in Case B were
found liable for breaches of their duties of care and loyalty and
ordered to pay various amounts in damages and interest to the
corporation. The remaining claims were dismissed.]
Facts and Reason
Disputed Issue #1: Whether there was an act of neglect of job
responsibility on the part of defendants with respect to the
Construction of an Internal Control System.
25
[1. Duty of oversight and duty to establish a risk management
system.]
Conducting sound corporate management requires accurately
assessing conditions of various kinds of risk which are produced in
accordance with the type and nature of the business purpose....
and.., establishing a risk management system (so-called internal
control system) in response to the scale and nature, etc. of the
business conducted by the corporation. Since the board of directors
must pass a resolution for the performance of important business
matters (Commercial Code, art. 260(2)), the overall policy of a risk
management system, which relates to the fundamentals of corporate
management, requires the board of directors to pass a resolution. The
representative director and director in charge (of a business
department or function), who are in charge of business performance,
bear the responsibility to decide specifically, based on the overall
policy, the risk management system for the department(s) for which
he is in charge. In this sense, directors, as members of the board of
directors, and also as a representative director or director in charge,
bear a duty to construct a risk management system, and, in addition,
24. Nishimura, 1721 HANREI JIHO 3. The following section contains the author's
translated excerpts of the court's decision in the Daiwa Bank Case. The author has added
some headings and subdivisions.
25. Id.
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bear a duty to monitor whether or not the representative director and
director in charge are performing their duty to establish a risk
management system, and this also should be said to constitute the
contents of the duty of care and duty of loyalty as a director.
Auditors, since they bear the job responsibility of auditing business
operations, bear a duty to audit whether or not the directors are
carrying out the construction of a risk management system, and this
also should be said to constitute the contents of the duty of care as an
Auditor.26
[2. Decision standard for Daiwa's risk management system/risk
of hindsight bias.]
However, the contents of the risk management system to be created
are gradually realized through the accumulation of experience in
which risk materializes and causes various cases and incidents, and
through progress on research concerning risk management.
Accordingly, it would not be appropriate to take the level of risk
management system which is currently required of financial
institutions from the standpoint of ensuring sound and appropriate
management of business in light of various financial scandals, and
making it the decision standard in this case. Also, what should be the
contents of the risk management system to be created is a question of
business judgment, and we must be mindful that broad discretion is
granted to directors who are specialists in corporate management...27
[3. Evaluation of Daiwa's risk management system.
The court next turned to the specific question of whether there was an
appropriate risk management system in Daiwa's New York branch
and whether the directors and Auditors of Daiwa had fulfilled their
duties with respect thereto. The court found that the system of
internal controls was insufficient with respect to the appropriate
method for confirming custody account balances. The New York
Branch utilized a reconciliation procedure by which it compared the
custodian's account statements with its own books and records. But
since the custodian's (Bankers Trust's) account statements were
obtained through Iguchi (and not directly from Bankers Trust), this
confirmation method left room for concealment by a trader. With
respect to the defendants' argument that this method of confirmation
was the same as the one generally employed in the industry, the court
found:]
26. Id. at 32-33.
27. Id. at 33.
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[I]t is difficult to consider that financial institutions conducting
custody business were generally using an examination system with an
important shortcoming and that definitive proof sufficient to support
this contention was not submitted (to the court). And, so long as the
examination system has an important shortcoming, even if, arguendo,
it were true that other financial institutions were using the same
method, it does not mean that Daiwa Bank's examination method
would be assessed as [having been appropriate] 28
[4. Liability for inappropriate internal controls/principle of
reliance. ]
In a large-scale enterprise which has a vast structure like Daiwa
Bank, having the president or the deputy president directly
supervising each business (department or function) is, of course,
inappropriate from the standpoint of efficient and rational
management and is also not possible. With respect to confirmation of
the custody account balances for U.S. treasuries, the Inspection
Department and the New York Branch which are in charge of this
have been established, and an organization has been created which
anticipates that the directors in charge of both of these departments
will, on their responsibility, conduct appropriate performance of their
business. The president and deputy president are permitted to entrust
the conduct of such business to each director in charge, and so long
as there are no special circumstances which raise doubts about the
contents of the business performance of each director in charge, it is
reasonable to understand that they will not bear liability for neglect of
supervision of business. In this case, there are no allegations or proof
of such special circumstances.
29
Disputed Issue #2: Whether there was an Act of Neglect of Job
Responsibility on the part of the Defendants with respect to Violation
of U.S. law.
30
[C]ompliance with law is a fundamental principle of corporate
management. Article 266(l)(5) of the Commercial Code not only
requires directors to comply with the laws of Japan, but if a company
expands its business overseas and establishes bases overseas such as
branches or representative offices, then it must also comply with
foreign law.
3 1
28. Id. at 37.
29. Id. at 38.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 39.
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[5. Defendants' intent or negligence for violation of law.]
[E]ven assuming they did not sufficiently understand the detailed
contents of U.S. banking laws, an incident in which one suffers a
large loss of some 1.1 billion dollars due to unauthorized trading and
unauthorized sales.., should have prompted an immediate
investigation and examination of U.S. laws relating to such a rare and
unusual case. But it was on the 25 th of that month [August] that they
first queried a U.S. law office via a Japanese law office and
conducted an investigation. It must be said that the investigation was
indeed late and a lost opportunity.... Even assuming that the...
defendants did not know at the time ... that each such act violated
U.S. federal codes, it is clear that they are negligent as managers of a
bank which is developing business in the United States .... 32
[6. Japan's business judgment rule.]
[T]o pursue liability against a director for a past management
measure as a violation of the duty of care and duty of loyalty requires
that, at the time the business measure was taken, there was an
important and careless mistake in grasping the facts which form the
basis of the director's judgment or the process, [and/or] substance of
decision-making was especially unreasonable or inappropriate as a
business manager. However, although directors are granted broad
discretion, in conducting corporate management they are required to
comply with laws and ordinances, including foreign law ... and...
are not granted discretion about whether or not to comply with laws
and ordinances, including foreign laws.... Even considering the
difficult situation of Daiwa Bank at the time, [the defendants] made
an extremely unreasonable and inappropriate business judgment as
corporate business managers in violation of directors' duties of care
and loyalty.
33
[7. Whether administrative guidance from government
bureaucrats could excuse defendants' violations of law.]
Defendants in the Violation of Law Case argue that there was no
possibility (kitai kanosei) of going against the requests and
suggestions of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and reporting to U.S.
authorities the facts of the unauthorized trading and unauthorized
sales in this case. However, there is not sufficient evidence submitted
to this court to find that MOF, based on its authority, gave defendants
Akira Fujita et. al. instructions or orders that they not report to U.S.
32. Id. at 43.
33. Id.at42,44.
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authorities. Rather, as long as Daiwa Bank conducted banking
business in the United States, they had an obligation to observe
United States' laws and regulations affecting banks. As managers of
a bank, defendants Akira Fujita et. al. were responsible for making
appropriate business judgments on their own. Even though the
Japanese economy has developed and expanded on a global scale,
defendants Akira Fujita et. al. adhered to informal local rules which
are accepted only in Japan. The defendants sought to overcome
Daiwa Bank's crisis by relying on the prestige of the Director
General of MOF's Banking Bureau. As a result, they suffered harsh
treatment from United States authorities. The argument of the
defendants in the Violation of Law Case that there was no possibility
(kitai kanosei) means that it is permissible to conduct banking
business by relying on the decisions and instructions of the MOF
without making decisions based on their own judgment and at their
own responsibility. We naturally reject such an argument.34
Disputed Issue #3: Existence, Scope of Damages for which the
Defendants should Compensate.
[The author has omitted Case A. In Case B, the court discusses legal
causation (i.e., foreseeability of the result of a plea bargain and the
U.S. doctrine of vicarious liability):]
As long as neglect of job responsibility on the part of the defendants
is found concerning the facts related to counts of the indictment in
this case to which [the defendants] pleaded guilty, even if a plea
bargain is intervening, so long as there are no special circumstances
found, such as the process and results of the plea bargain being
markedly different from that which is normally anticipated, legal
causation between acts of neglect of job responsibility and damages
resulting from payment of the criminal fine will not be denied. There
is no allegation or proof of such special circumstances.
35
3. Aftermath of the Daiwa Case
The resulting "Daiwa shock" had a far-reaching effect in Japan
similar to the combined impact the leading Delaware cases, Van Gorkom
and Caremark, had in the United States. The aftermath of the Daiwa
Bank case includes important substantive legal doctrine, a seemingly
more activist role for courts, increased importance of preventive legal
advice, a breakdown in the market for directors' liability insurance and
34. Id. at 43.
35. Id. at 44.
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new legislation to limit directors' liability and address issues of corporate
governance.
D. Commercial Code Limitation on Directors'Liability
Following the Daiwa case, an amendment to the Commercial Code
was enacted in November 2001 that limits directors' liability in
shareholder derivative suits and takes certain measures to increase the
Auditors' independence. The provisions concerning directors' liability,
which appear in new paragraphs 7 through 23 of article 266 of the
Commercial Code, provide for the following:
* Introduction of exculpatory charter provisions limiting the
amount of directors' liability for damages and a
corresponding procedure for an after-the-fact release of
directors from liability
* In both cases, limitation of liability is predicated on the
consent of Auditors and shareholders through a special
resolution (i.e., approved by two-thirds of shareholders)
" In both cases, acts not done in good faith and gross
negligence are excluded from coverage and directors'
liability is not limited
* In both cases, where directors' liability is properly limited,
the maximum amount of liability for directors is based on
annual compensation: two years for outside directors, four
years for inside directors and six years for representative
directors
* For an after-the-fact -release from liability, the board of
directors may pass a resolution to such effect, but such
board resolution may be challenged by any shareholder(s)
holding 3% of the corporation's shares.
E. Parallels and Differences Between U.S. and Japanese Law
1. Parallels Between the U.S. and Japan
" Directors' Duty of Care: Both the U.S. cases and the
Daiwa Case placed new emphasis on directors' duty of care
(in cases of both board action and inaction) and seemingly
expanded the potential scope of directors' liability
* Aftermath of Cases: The aftermath of Van Gorkom and
Daiwa each included new legal doctrine, new importance
for preventive legal advice, a breakdown in the market for
directors' liability insurance and new legislation to limit
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directors' liability
" Shareholder Derivative Suit: These cases evidence the
shareholder derivative suit system operating in a
surprisingly similar manner in the U.S. and Japan, with the
potential for at least certain "big" cases to exert a real
impact on corporate practices
* Role of Courts: The role of courts in interpreting broad
liability standards for the duty of care looks surprisingly
similar in the U.S. and Japan, despite Japan's civil law
system and statutory fiduciary duties
* Difficulties in Standards of Liability: There are similar
difficulties in both countries in reducing the duty of care to
a clear standard of liability, as concepts such as negligence
and gross negligence are not very useful in defining
proscribed conduct
2. Differences Between the U.S. and Japan
" Board action or inaction vs. individual job
responsibilities: Whereas U.S. courts tend to focus on
board action or inaction when considering director's
liability, Japanese courts closely examine the individual job
responsibilities and actions of each director due to the lack
of separation of officers and directors in Japan
* Legislation: Japanese legislation to limit directors' liability
protects outside directors more than inside directors, while
U.S. legislation protects all directors equally
* Reliance on outside counsel: The lack of reliance on
outside counsel in the Daiwa Bank Case is a striking
contrast to recent U.S. cases such as Caremark
* Business judgment rule: A business judgment rule that
focuses exclusively or primarily on procedural
considerations creates difficulties in Japan due to limited
corporate disclosure and discovery in litigation.
F Comparison with U.S. Law-Questions and Answers
1. Director's Liability; Separation of Directors and Officers
Q.. You are a judge in the Daiwa Bank Case and wish to apply the
fiduciary duties set forth in the Commercial Code in a meaningful way to
directors and Auditors in the Daiwa Bank scandal. You are also aware
that Daiwa Bank, like most Japanese corporations, has a large,
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hierarchical board in which virtually all directors maintain management
responsibilities. Would you hold all board members and Auditors liable
for board action (approving settlement of the U.S. criminal case in Case
B) or inaction (failure to establish an overall risk management policy in
Case A)? Or would you consider each director's individual job
responsibility and involvement in the matter? Is there a similar issue
under U.S. law?
A. Although the theoretical duties of care (including the
oversight/monitoring component) seem functionally similar in the U.S.
and Japan, there is a major difference in courts' applications of these
duties to individual directors.
In Case A, while the Daiwa court ruled that it is the duty of the
board as a whole to formulate and implement policies and internal
systems to deal with compliance and other concerns, it never actually
examined whether the board of directors passed a resolution establishing
an overall risk management policy. Instead, it pursued an inquiry that
focused on which individual directors were in a position, due to their job
responsibility, to devise and implement specific policies to prevent and
detect the wrongdoing at issue. In Case B, where there was a board
resolution (required by U.S. prosecutors) approving the plea bargain
under which Daiwa paid a $340 million criminal fine, no defendant was
found liable for approving or failing to object to the board resolution.
Rather, the court examined the individual circumstances of each
defendant to see if and when a defendant learned of the cover-up from
the president or other top executives of Daiwa and failed to exercise his
fiduciary duty as a director or Auditor by objecting to the cover-up plan
in a timely manner. All eleven directors who were involved in
formulating and implementing the cover-up were found to be liable. It
was determined that other directors lacked the information or
management position necessary to enable them to object to the cover-up.
In the U.S., one would expect, as occurred in Van Gorkom, that all
directors would potentially bear liability for board action or inaction for
any breach of their fiduciary duty. Logically, the same result could be
reached in Japan for both directors and Auditors. However, the
traditional lack of separation of officers and directors in Japan may make
it seem unduly harsh or "unfair" to hold all directors liable when both
policy-making and board decision-making is essentially controlled by top
management. Instead, as in the Daiwa Case, Japanese courts focus their
inquiry on directors and Auditors who have job responsibilities in the
relevant areas and/or involvement in the decision-making on the matter
in question.36
36. This is a good example to help students truly appreciate the oft-cited importance
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2. Principle of Reliance
Q. Could Daiwa have avoided liability for violation of U.S. law
through reliance on timely advice from outside counsel? How do you
think a U.S. court would have viewed Daiwa's argument that it should be
permitted to rely on the informal advice of Japanese government (MOF)
officials?
A. In the Daiwa Case, reliance on other directors, Auditors and
employees is permitted unless there are special circumstances that raise
doubts about such reliance. This is the reason most directors were not
found liable in the Trading Loss Case (Case A), and generally resembles
U.S. law in the Graham case.37 However, as this is a relatively new
doctrine in Japan, there is no specific reference in Japanese cases to
conditions for such reliance, such as selection with due care or reliance
in good faith.
Directors' use of outside counsel and other experts in reaching
board decisions or exercising oversight functions is an important issue in
the area of director's liability. While the Delaware Supreme Court, in
Van Gorkom, explicitly rejected the notion that the board was required to
obtain an outside expert's opinion of the fair value of Trans Union's
shares, it nevertheless seems clear that such outside advice would have
been important in assuring that the board reached an informed decision.
Similarly, in Caremark, the Chancellor cited the board's consultation
with its legal counsel as evidence that its directors were highly unlikely
to have been found liable for monetary damages for a breach of their
duty of oversight, despite large criminal fines assessed against Caremark.
Reliance on outside counsel was also a potentially important issue
in the Daiwa Case. The bank initially consulted with the MOF, and
there was little initial focus on U.S. law. Daiwa officials in Japan did
consult with U.S. counsel indirectly in late August (1995) and directly in
early September only after being urged to do so by the bank's own U.S.
headquarters. Ironically, timely and full consultation with a U.S. lawyer
might have allowed Daiwa to escape expulsion from the United States
and criminal liability. In the Japanese derivative suit, Daiwa argued that
its directors should not be liable for violations of U.S. law precisely
because they consulted with U.S. counsel concerning their proposed
of the separation of officers and directors in the U.S. and the general U.S. practice of
having small, active boards. It also illustrates the difficulties of enforcing fiduciary
duties in a corporate law system that lacks such separation of officers and directors.
37. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963) (in which the
Delaware Supreme Court established the principle that directors have no affirmative duty
to establish and maintain a corporate monitoring system "absent cause for suspicion" and
there would be no liability unless there were "obvious danger signs of employee
wrongdoing" that went unheeded).
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timetable for the disclosure of losses to U.S. bank regulators and tried in
good faith to comply with U.S. law thereafter. The court rejected their
argument, essentially characterizing their consultation with U.S. lawyers
as being "too little, too late" in light of the unusual trading loss, which
led to criminal liability. In the Daiwa Case, the question of consultation
with lawyers arose in the broader context of the defendants' intent or
negligence with respect to the violation of U.S. law, rather than directly
as a right of reliance issue. Nevertheless, the Daiwa Case discusses this
question for the first time and creates an expectation that reliance on
outside counsel would likely be permitted.
Widely quoted in newspapers, this "MOF defense" appeared to be
the main theme of the defendants' American attorneys in both of the
original criminal actions in New York against Daiwa Bank and its New
York branch general manager. Perhaps this "defense" was meant partly
to take advantage of the American perception of the prevalence of such
informal practices in Japan and their supposed link to ingrained "cultural
values." In any event, as both of those actions were settled by means of
plea bargains, the issue was never tested in U.S. courts. If it had been
argued in the U.S., presumably an American court would have taken the
same approach as the Daiwa court, requiring proof of government
"policy," i.e., actions taken by the agency based on its legal authority and
binding on Daiwa Bank. Although the Daiwa court made no finding on
this point, its discussion implies that Daiwa might have sought informal
MOF approval for its predetermined course of action, rather than being a
"victim" of heavy-handed bureaucratic interference.
3. Business Judgment Rule
Q. Do courts in the Van Gorkom, Caremark and Daiwa cases apply the
business judgment rule, misapply it or ignore it? Are courts in a position
to evaluate business decisions fully and accurately? Does the business
judgment rule cover only procedural issues or does it extend to the
substance of business decisions? Should the Japanese rule be any
different from the one in the U.S.?
A. The various views of Van Gorkom38 highlight the difficulty of
38. A widespread critical view held that the court, in reversing the initial decision of
the chancellor to find director's liability despite any allegation of a lack of good faith, had
in fact departed significantly from prior jurisprudence focusing on the business judgment
rule. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union
Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437 (1985); Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on
Life in the Boardroom after Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1 (1985). It should be noted that
one school of thought held that Van Gorkom was consistent with prior cases, and the
unusual result was based on an egregious fact pattern under which the board of directors
completely deferred to the chief executive officer and virtually abandoned its
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formulating a clear legal rule that reflects the conflicting considerations
underlying the business judgment rule.
In both the U.S. and Japan, the business judgment rule represents
legal doctrine that seeks to achieve a balance between providing directors
with discretionary authority to make business judgments and providing
an incentive to ensure good faith performance of their duties. This
dilemma goes far in explaining the procedural emphasis in Van Gorkom
and the ongoing debate over to what extent, if any, the business judgment
rule covers the substance of business decisions. Although most Japanese
commentators have advocated following a procedurally based approach,
as utilized in the U.S., courts have not clearly done so. Attempting to
focus on decision-making processes (adequate information gathering,
review, use of outside experts, etc.) in Japan would squarely encounter
traditional views hostile to public disclosure of confidential corporate
processes. This obstacle, compounded by the absence of an effective
litigation discovery system, would make it difficult for the plaintiffs or
the court to obtain sufficient information on the decision-making process.
Such circumstances might require or justify a greater emphasis in Japan
on a court's reviewing the substance of business decisions. In Japan,
courts tend to include in their business judgment standard some
examination of the reasonableness of the substantive business judgment
in ruling on this issue.
At the same time, however, a review of substantive business
decisions would highlight the troubling question of hindsight bias, which
is an issue raised by commentators on Van Gorkom and is highly relevant
to the Daiwa Case. A fundamental underpinning of the business
judgment rule is concern about the adequacy of the litigation process to
retrospectively judge the reasonableness of directors' decision-making.
The Daiwa court acknowledged this danger and explicitly stated that it
must not retroactively apply current standards concerning internal
controls to Daiwa's directors during the period from 1984 through 1995.
It nevertheless found a breach of directors' duties by focusing narrowly
on a detailed aspect of internal controls that arguably may not have been
considered significant under the prevailing standards during that period.
Technically, the court did not apply the business judgment rule (in Case
responsibility to make an independent judgment in the best interests of the corporation.
See, e.g., Barry F. Schwartz & James G. Wiles, TRANS UNION: NEITHER "NEW" LAW NOR
"BAD" LAW, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 429 (1985). Another approach regarded Van Gorkom as
a precursor to subsequent Delaware decisions, which required greater care by directors in
the context of change of control decisions. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P.
Miller, TRANS UNION RECONSIDERED, 98 YALE L.J. 127 (1988). There is language in the
Caremark decision that supports this latter view, as Van Gorkom is referred to as the first
in a line of recent Delaware Supreme Court cases on "jurisprudence concerning
takeovers." 698 A.2d at 970.
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A, because in an oversight context the board had not acted, and in Case
B, because the court found that a violation of law was not within
directors' discretion). It appears that Japanese courts will now face the
same issues relating to standards for liability and the business judgment
rule that have troubled U.S. courts, although recent legislation enacted in
response to the Daiwa case has essentially institutionalized the business
judgment rule in Japan.
4. Statutes and Courts
Q. In Japan, fiduciary duties of directors are set forth in the
Commercial Code, while in many states, such as Delaware, they are
developed through case law. Is there any real difference? Even in Japan,
the doctrines of reliance and the business judgment rule result from court
decisions. Does this surprise you?
A. Although the question of judge-made law versus legislative
standards is highly debated in the U.S. with respect to the director's duty
of care, in either case the standard of liability will be very broad. Rather,
the issue is the future development of the application of such principles
because proponents of judge-made law believe courts can be more
flexible in the law's application and development in response to
changing societal conditions. However, even with a legislative standard,
as in Japan, judges still have an opportunity to be flexible in their
application and interpretation. Despite our image of Japan as a civil law
system with conservative judges, in recent years, courts have been
innovative in developing rules such as the business judgment rule and the
principle of reliance to apply in duty of care cases. Perhaps someone
might say that judicial intervention on behalf of corporate directors is
conservative in a political sense rather than in the sense of judicial
restraint.
5. Standard of Liability
Q. Does a standard of negligence seem harsh for the duty of oversight
in the Trading Loss Case (Case A)? How about the same standard for
the Violation of Law Case (Case B)? The court discusses negligence,
but is that really the standard of liability? Would the result have been
different if the court had used a standard of gross negligence? Good
faith? When thinking about directors' conduct, how meaningful is the
difference between negligence and gross negligence?
A. A finding of liability (and $530 million in damages) based on
negligence appears harsh in the oversight context, and goes beyond
Caremark and other U.S. decisions. This illustrates that even in the
absence of a business judgment, policy considerations similar to those
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underlying the business judgment rule would seem to warrant a standard
higher than ordinary negligence for director liability. The court, by
focusing on a narrow accounting issue, never directly addresses the
defendants' argument that Daiwa's New York branch had an adequate
system of internal controls but that Iguchi's unusually clever scheme
managed to circumvent it.
On the other hand, the Daiwa court's approach is not internally
consistent with respect to a standard of liability. Despite ruling that the
business judgment rule was inapplicable, in the Violation of Law Case
(Case B), the court went on to find that President Fujita and the other
defendants "made an extremely unreasonable and inappropriate business
judgment as corporate business managers" in violation of their duties of
care and loyalty. It thus sounds as if this case could also be treated as
one of gross negligence, in which liability was found on the part of the
defendants regardless of the application or non-application of the
business judgment rule. Furthermore, an argument could be made that
although the defendants were presumably unaware of the details of
American law initially, by initiating a cover-up, they demonstrated a lack
of good faith. The Daiwa court did not reach this issue, as the inquiry
was phrased in terms of negligence and the business judgment rule.
The difficulties in formulating and implementing a standard to
achieve the balancing of interests under the business judgment rule are
reflected in the widespread criticism of concepts such as "negligence" or
"gross negligence" on the basis that they represent ex post
characterizations of director behavior, which do not provide sufficient
certainty in light of the broad discretion directors are expected to
exercise. The Daiwa case provides a good illustration of this often-made
point,
6. Limits on Directors' Liability
Q. To what extent does the 2001 amendment to the Commercial Code
limit directors' liability? What would be the result in the Daiwa Bank
Case if the amendment had been in effect and Daiwa Bank had enacted
an exculpatory charter provision? How do you view the amendment's
distinction between liability limits for inside directors and outside
directors? Is this a good idea for Japanese law? Should it be utilized in
U.S. law?
A. The 2001 amendment excludes cases involving a knowing violation
of law, bad faith or gross negligence from both the exculpatory charter
provision and the release provision. The exclusion of gross negligence
does not go as far as the exculpatory charter provisions in the U.S. This
may reflect the Amendment's origin as a proposal by business groups-
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they originally asked for, among other matters, a codification of Japan's
version of the business judgment rule. It may also reflect Japan's limited
experience to date with lawsuits holding directors liable. Additionally, it
may be the result of considerable opposition to the amendment by some
legal commentators and, initially, by the political opposition parties.
Industry groups agreed with this limited approach only upon receiving
assurances that it would constitute only the first step in a series of
measures designed to address industry concerns. It is questionable
whether the existence of an exculpatory provision based on the
amendment would have affected the outcome in the Daiwa Case because
the court's decision would presumably have found liability under a
standard of gross negligence.
In the U.S. there is no distinction between inside directors and
outside directors. The focus is on action or inaction by the board as a
whole, and it is considered necessary to provide outside directors with
the same incentive for faithful performance of their duties as inside
directors. The distinction under the Delaware exculpatory charter
provision is rather between directors and officers, since only actions "as
a director" may be protected through limitations on personal liability.
In Japan, the Daiwa decision already suggests that directors whose
job responsibilities would not place them in a position to deal with a
potential problem are far less likely to bear personal liability; as outside
directors are perhaps the only directors without any line responsibilities,
they would presumably benefit. Perhaps, from a functional standpoint,
one could even think of Japanese directors with line responsibilities as
"officers" in American terms and outside directors as being the only
"true" directors. The 2001 amendment establishes, for the first time, an
explicit legal distinction between the liability of inside and outside
directors. Arguably, such a distinction is useful in the Japanese context,
given the traditional focus on directors' job responsibilities in Japan, the
recent interest in increasing the number and role of outside directors, and
the legal requirement under the 2002 amendment that all listed
companies have at least one outside director.
7. Effect of Lawsuits on Corporate Practices
Q. To what extent do the results in a particular derivative lawsuit have
a broader impact on actual corporate practices or act to improve
corporate governance? How might they do so?
A. The comparison between Van Gorkom and Daiwa is most relevant
in relation to the broad impact of the court's decision on business, the
legislature, and markets. Both cases appeared, to industry, to cast serious
doubt on the proposition that the small subset of derivative suits likely to
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result in directors' liability was well established and stable. 39 These
cases leave in their aftermath a fear that qualified individuals will be
unwilling to serve as directors, a concern about the availability of
directors and officers (D&O) insurance, new legislation to limit
directors' liability and consultation with outside experts, and changes in
practices in an effort to reduce the future risk of liability.
One could argue that Van Gorkom, Caremark and Daiwa were all
unusual cases that should not concern a conscientious board of directors.
Van Gorkom involved an egregious fact pattern and liability could
presumably have been avoided by means of modest information
gathering and consultation with outside experts. The Delaware
Chancellor approved the Caremark settlement only because it did not
involve director's liability for compensatory damages, and it contained
measures concerning compliance policies that were consistent with
corporate initiatives already underway at the time. Daiwa also involves
egregious facts that are unlikely to be repeated. Yet all of these cases,
particularly Van Gorkom and Daiwa, invoked tremendous corporate
responses, as they nevertheless appeared to threaten industry's perceived
certainty concerning the director's standard of liability.
There is a widely held view in the U.S. that shareholder derivative
suits generally are not an effective means of monitoring board
performance or improving corporate governance because the true parties
in interest are often the plaintiffs' attorneys and even unmeritorious suits
are often settled due to the availability of indemnification provisions and
insurance. However, even if this is true for the typical derivative suit,
Van Gorkom, Caremark and Daiwa indicate that the few derivative suits
establishing new or broader duties for directors can have an outsized
impact on corporate governance practices. This might be particularly
true when industry's reaction provides an opportunity for lawyers to
advise corporations on new risks and preventive measures and thus to
amplify the impact of a court's decision on directors' duties.
III. Conclusion
Despite the significant differences between Japan and the U.S.,
including Japan's civil law system in which directors' duties are
prescribed by statute, and a "legal culture" that is generally perceived to
be quite different from that of the U.S. and Europe, there are surprising
similarities between court decisions on the fiduciary duties of directors in
Japan and the U.S. The courts played similar roles and encountered
39. For example, liability would only occur in exceptional cases that did not merit
the protection of the business judgment rule in the U.S., or that represented instances of
clear misconduct by directors in Japan.
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similar difficulties in interpreting broad formulations of the duty of care
and reducing them to a clear standard of liability. In addition, the
aftermath of the Daiwa Bank Case is far-reaching and similar to the
combined impact in the U.S. of the leading Delaware cases of Van
Gorkom and Caremark: new substantive legal doctrine, a seemingly
more activist role for courts with the potential for improvement of
corporate practices, and new legislation to limit directors' liability and
address issues of corporate governance. Although the parallels are
striking, significant differences remain. The landmark Daiwa Bank Case
arguably may have held directors to a higher standard than U.S. court
decisions, but this was likely influenced by the relative paucity of cases
in Japan in the past and the corresponding unimportance of the standard
of liability heretofore utilized in court decisions. In other areas, such as
the principle of reliance and the business judgment rule, court-formulated
legal doctrine in Japan is either poorly developed, compared to U.S. case
law, or it encounters difficulties in meshing with prevalent disclosure and
discovery practices in Japan.
The materials presented herein demonstrate that, although by no
means a simple task, it is possible to add a comparative perspective to
basic courses such as business organizations without adding new sections
devoted specifically to comparative law. I believe that such an approach,
by providing a starker contrast with a different legal system, effectively
highlights distinctive features of the U.S. system. It brings to life core
concepts such as the separation of officers and directors and the role of
outside directors by means of comparison with a Japanese legal system
that has traditionally lacked such concepts, and in which courts are
struggling to decide personal liability for directors based on the acts of
individual directors rather than, as in the U.S., on actions of the board as
a whole. Hopefully we will continue to address and make progress on
the challenging but rewarding task of adding a comparative perspective
to basic courses in the law school curriculum.
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